Defence Planning and Resource Management: Importance of Strategic Documents for Defence Planning

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Introduction

Central and Eastern European (CEE) military forces have undergone dramatic changes in the post-communist era. All of them have conducted significant downsizing, reoriented their national security strategies and military doctrines to adapt to the post-Cold War strategic environment, and achieved essential elements of subordination to democratic political control. Three CEE states – Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland – were granted NATO membership during the first stage of the NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement in 1997. Seven other states received invitations at the Prague Summit in November 2002 – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, all of them were victims of their Warsaw Pact legacies which have had a long-term impact on their societies, politics, as well as national security cultures. The adaptation of the national security apparatuses, inherited from the communist era, posed the greatest challenge.¹

While speaking about Slovakia’s approach to the NATO and the EU development and defence reform, we should look back at the Slovak Security Policy development and its influence on security and defence planning. The MoD and the Armed Forces were and continually are:

- mostly under the influence of NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy development;
- institutions which are deeply interested in security documents preparation (they were and are a way out for the defence reforms).

The first effort to reform the Army failed due to bad or no security vision and the lack of comprehensive programme for the defence system that is essential for such a vision. It means to have a comprehensive and transparent Defence Planning and Resource Management System. The Security/Defence Strategy without resources (funding) is just a pure theory on the paper. On the other hand, Defence Plan and Budget without strategy are just wasting

money (state budget). This begs the question what kind of civilian control should be in defence spending area – as a part of a comprehensive democratic control of the defence activities. The defence planning, budgeting, financial management, procurement of the weapons and equipment administered a big part of the state budget. The defence department guides a powerful, expensive and autonomous organisation, and therefore the democratic control of the MoD and the AF expenses is an important issue. Among important levers of democratic control, the Defence Planning and Resource Management System represents a critical issue. It requires the management, check, and control not only at the MoD level (taking into consideration that the MoD as such is a part of the democratic control), but at the governmental and parliamentary level as well.

At the MoD level, the particular attention must be given to the establishment of “internal” structures in the Defence Planning and Resource Management Area – separation of planners from budget people; institution of independent “controlling” structure. At the governmental level (despite the power and position of the Minister of Defence), some kind of supervision structure would be quite a good idea. In Slovakia, it might be the Security Council and its part – the Defence Planning Committee. According to the Slovak laws, Security Council is a governmental institution. The next question is what role the General Staff should play in this area. The relationship with the Parliament represents the highest level of planning and control structure. The parliamentary control depends on the Constitution and laws, and beside the power of the Parliament to pass the proposal of the budget, there are several other possibilities of parliamentary responsibility in the defence planning area. The Defence Committee, approval of the Defence Planning Law, the Long-Term Plan of the AF Development, etc. Parliament must understand the AF needs. It means to comprehend what resources are required, how they are utilised, or what requirements NATO and the EU have as for defence capabilities.

Defence funding is a problematic issue. We know that a NATO demand, which represents allocation of 2% of GDP to the defence area, poses problem not only in transition countries (including Slovakia). The second problem is that the national budget follows up the 4-year mandate of the Government, while the NATO planning cycle is based on the 6-year rotating system. So the planning, programming, and budgeting system in the AF is not compatible with the system of national budget preparation. The civilian democratic control of this area is problematic, too. Moreover, it seems that this does not fall into the realm of the highest interest of taxpayers, democratic controlling institutions, or even the NGOs.

Let us follow a connection between the strategic documents and defence planning, or more particular influence of strategic documents on the defence planning.

The first years after the establishment of the Slovak Republic and its Armed Forces (1993) were focused on creation of the MoD, General Staff, new forces, or new command and control system. In 1994, the MoD worked out “The Concept of SR Army Building till 2000” which presented a programme of relatively small, though well trained, and equipped army comparable with forces of the Western nations. The concept had been divided into 2 phases, from which only the first one was realised (in 1994 – 1995). Within this phase, a common system of command and organisational structure was established, and coincidence with Vienna Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe was provided. The second phase failed. In a simplified way, we might observe that most of the politicians were not qualified enough in the Security and Defence Area (they were not able to agree on relevant defence doctrine/strategy) and a majority of military was burdened by “traditional” thinking of “territorial defence” against an attack coming from neighbouring border. The missing co-ordination between “military parameters” of the Armed Forces transformation and “political parameters” was a cause of problems. This period was characterised by permanent changes in organisational structures. The formal aspects of the Armed Forces reform were overestimated, while the need for overall change of the Armed Forces character was underrated. The qualitative parameters of the AF transformation were rather neglected, at the expense of accelerating a reorganisation and re-dislocation of the military units.

The fulfilment of the second phase of the AF reform began at the turn of 1995/1996. Information about the second phase was vague and the MoD working groups started with preparation of new reform called “The Integrated Programme of Army Development till 2010 with Outlook till 2015.” The main aim was to concretize the Long-Term Plan till 2010 with preservation of the Defence Doctrine 1994 and the National Defence Strategy 1996 principles. During the second phase, the AF reform braked. The process of the Armed Forces transformation and the process of Slovakia’s integration to NATO were not harmonized. Moreover, there were some difficulties with AF modernization and rearmament, with increasing of military potential and professional readiness. In 1998, after

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2 Rearmament and modernization of the army has remained a problem even after the accession to NATO. It seems that their financial demands are not sufficiently evaluated, neither after an introduction of comprehensive process of defence planning. On the other hand, early start-up of rearmament process in the given period would mean resources wasting. As it will be demonstrated later, NATO also changed an approach to building of the capabilities after the Washington Summit in 1999, Prague Summit (Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)).
constitution of new government and new garniture at the MoD (see the previous chapters), this document was put ad - acta.

The first attempt of the Defence and AF reform failed mostly because it had been covered with old documents from 1994 and 1996. These documents corresponded neither with development of security environment, nor with new governmental statement of 1998. The preparation of the Defence and AF reform had been prepared without having new conceptual security documents, because those were not prepared in that time. This was a key factor limiting the success of the previous reform efforts. The Slovak Ministry of Defence published *The Defence Doctrine* (1994), followed by the *National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (1996), and the *Concept of Reform till 2003*. However, each of these policy and doctrinal statements was short on overarching national security strategy. Therefore, they lacked both a logical hierarchy and the consensus that is founded in mature national security systems. The U.S. Department of Defense external evaluators criticized these efforts and evaluated them as not adequately addressing the defence requirements and concepts of their time. The “*Defence Assessment of the Slovak Republic*” from 1999 stipulated that key elements which were essential to provide the conceptual basis for the future military reform, such as the broad National Security Strategy and a subsequent National Military Strategy, were missing.

**NATO’s Influence on the Planning Process till 1998**

Despite the difficulties connected with the AF transformation, some reform processes influenced by mechanisms of cooperation with NATO began. One of them was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme which was focused on cooperation in the political and military field, helped with transparency of the Defence Planning and Budgets, and strengthened civilian democratic control of the AF. In January 1994, the SR Government signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document which provided the basis for the Individual Partnership Plan (IPP), adopted by NATO in November 1994. The latter was updated annually. The first activities based on the IPP were aimed to strengthen mutual confidence through exchange of information concerning defence planning transparency and the democratic control of the AF. However, just a minimum part of the MoD budget was allocated for these activities. In 1994, this sum represented 10 million SKK (0.1 % of defence budget), and in 1995 it was 129 million SKK (1% of defence budget). In 1995, the Slovak Republic joined two-year NATO planning, known as PARP. This required an increase in financial means from 129 million to 262.3

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3 Mm Peterson Ulrich, p. 200.
4 The Partnership Planning and Review Process (PARP) began in 1995 and were deliberately modelled on NATO force planning. It had been one of the key elements in PfP and absorbed about 40% of the efforts of national and NATO defence planning staff. The PfP nations in the PARP only declared forces that might be made available on a voluntary basis for non-Article 5 operations.
million SKK. The declared forces of the SR started to be prepared for peace and humanitarian operations. Since 1995, the number of activities within the PARP framework has increased. Moreover, it is not only Ministry of Defence, but also civilian ones which have taken part in these activities. At the end of 1996, Slovakia decided to launch the second phase of the PARP (summer 1997 – 1999), in which Interoperability Objectives were broadened on more units of the SR Armed Forces. In 1997, 641 million SKK (4.1 % of defence budget) were allocated for the PfP and PARP activities. In 1998, the first officers were sent to the NATO staff structures, which were established for partnership countries, and staffs in the SFOR operation. Thirty Partnership Objectives were to ensure achievement of a minimum level of interoperability of the forces, that the Slovak Republic had set aside. Despite financial difficulties, the whole PARP process influenced the AF transformation and launched the defence planning process. At the same time, it influenced a progressive formation of mechanism of more comprehensive preparation for the NATO membership. That was, however, carried out only later. The PARP mechanism enabled a transition towards an establishment of defence planning, which has been created step by step since 1995 as an integral part of the state control. However, it was much later when it managed to reach the nationwide comprehensive level. The experience gained thanks to participation in the international planning (PiP, IPP, PARP) was later used in preparation of the defence planning at national level. Before the planning at national level, the defence planning at the defence department level had started. The use of NATO knowledge initiated the first attempts to introduce Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). In 1997, the State Defence Council approved “The Report on State of the PPBS Introduction at the Defence Department”, including proposal of continuation in 1998 – 2012. As it has been already mentioned, the resolutions in the defence planning area were not implemented. An effort to harmonize strategic planning, resource planning, acquisitions, and operational planning, failed. The whole process lacked the sufficient institutionalization of the planning structures at the defence department (not speaking of governmental structures). All of these requirements started to be implemented in more consistent manner only after 1999. As regards civil democratic control of resources for the AF and the use of defence budget, this period was not characterized by creation of conditions for such a control. There was the lack of unequivocal determination of the position that parliament and its committees had at their disposal in approving defence planning documents; there was no adequate planning structures at the MoD; and the legislative covering of the above-mentioned area was deficient, too. In 1997 a document White Paper on Defence was prepared. However, it was not published due to some political skirmishes and changes in the MoD top-management. Moreover, a high secret level of all documents coming from the department did not enable a sufficient access to information. Likewise the above-mentioned defence documents from 1994 and 1996 (Defence Doctrine and Basic Objectives and Principles of National) which were prepared only by a narrow circle of people from the MoD, the

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5 Later, it was transformed into the State Security Council – author’s comment.
documents concerning development and formation of the Armed Forces were prepared in the same manner and high level of secret, too.

**Defence Reform in 1998 – 2001: The Slovak Republic Preparation for NATO Membership**

After the elections in 1998, a new government (more pro-Atlantic oriented than the preceding one) dealt with two simultaneous processes: launching a new phase of the AF reform and preparing the Slovak Republic for NATO membership. From the Armed Forces perspective, it was necessary to ensure compatibility between the Armed Forces and NATO standards.

On October 13, 1999, the Slovak Government approved “The Concept of Defence Department Reform till 2002” (with outlook to 2010). The goals it wanted to achieve were the AF transformation and balance between the AF requirements and the State resources. The document “The Concept of the Ministry of Defence Reform till 2002 with Outlook to 2010” launched a real change in the Slovak AF.

It was focused on these aims: to decrease the number of personnel, to establish land forces and air forces HQ, and particularly to relocate the General Staff from Trencin to Bratislava (120 km distance), with intention to integrate it into the Ministry of Defence. However, it was only a short-time oriented document inducing further problems. It aimed to balance the army needs with economic potential of the country and, at the same time, to initiate a process of creating the compatibility between the armed forces and the NATO standards. That was no easy matter, since preparation and application of the army reform were not based on conceptual security documents. The Current Conception (design) by 2002 had quite a general character, despite certain positive influence. It did not deal with a reform as such, but with certain “vision” of the reform. Therefore, in March 2001, a special commission dealing with armed forces reform was created. Consequently, several conceptual documents, including “The Slovak Republic Armed Forces – Model 2010”, were elaborated.

An intention was to provide the AF with ability to perform the tasks independently – following the principle of individual security – and at the same time to increase their ability to participate in NATO missions (operations away from Article 5). In that way, they ought to have prepared themselves for action within the NATO collective security principle (Article 5), in case of admission to the Alliance. After the first attempt on the reform was evaluated, it was clear that changes in the whole national security system were necessary and that the admission process was not an exclusive matter of the MoD and the AF. However, that called for acceptance of conceptual strategic documents that would create a new legislative framework. Despite this piece of knowledge, there was a paradoxical situation. Support of new strategic security documents within the AF reform was still lacking. That could base only on the above-mentioned documents from 1994 and 1996 that were not in accordance with new policy statement of the SR Government established after 1998 elections. Moreover, they did not
correspond to contemporary situation connected with Slovakia’s unequivocal orientation to NATO in the realm of foreign-policy. It is necessary to add that after the Washington Summit in April 1999, new NATO strategic concept “shuffle the cards”, too.

Within the preparation and execution of the reform, certain “institutional limits” at the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff played a negative role. There was a snag, since the competencies within the MoD and between the MoD and the General Staff were not transparently defined. There were also some political reasons inside the department. A part of the top-management did not see any interconnection between the process of Slovakia’s admission to NATO and the Armed Forces transformation process. For example, the analysis of the western consulting groups reproached the Minister of Defence, Pavol Kanis (1998 – 2000), for incapability or unwillingness to make more radical changes. He also came under the strong criticism because he entrusted the implementation of the AF reform to people who had neither sufficient professional qualification, nor political capability. The extent of their political will has been in question, too.

As regards practical measures within defence planning and the AF reform area, continuing Membership Action Plan (MAP) implementation played an important role. In June 1999, the SR Government passed the PRENAME (Preparation for NATO Membership) plan that was specified in annual plans. Its contribution resides in involvement of other departments into the process of Slovakia’s preparation for NATO membership. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a “guarantor” of the first chapter (political and economic issues) and the fifth chapter (legal issues) preparation. The Ministry of Defence was charged with the second chapter (defence and military issues). Other issues were entrusted to the newly-created PRENAME governmental committee. Following the approved PRENAME plan, Slovakia pledged to develop proposals of conceptual security documents, to implement perennial planning process and its successive harmonization with NATO planning processes, to keep up the AF reform, and to meet interoperability objectives as well as partnership objectives. The above-mentioned difficulties, however, caused that Slovakia’s integration to NATO became endangered by the AF reform difficulties, which became apparent in the second half of 2000. According to NATO assessment, adaptation of national security and defence system and laws to the NATO standards was not sufficient. The same applied to the Army transformation which did not comply with NATO criteria. Let us make closer analysis of the mentioned period.

The “Open Door” policy of the new government (established after the 1998 elections) brought a lot of teams from different countries, whose aim was to help the Slovak military, conduct an independent defence assessment and defence review, identify main problem areas, and recommend priorities for transforming the armed forces as well as the whole defence system.

The most important were the following ones:
The Army of the Slovak Republic Combat Capabilities Evaluation – 1999;
“C4 Study” completed by the US Air Force in July 2000;
The Slovak Republic Defense Reform Study – June 2000 by Major General Garrett of the U.S. Department of Defense (Garrett Study);
Defence Review of the Slovak Republic – January 2001 by Cubic Applications, Inc.(Cubic’s Defense Review);
Review of the Management Structure and Administration of the MoD and GS – 2000 conducted by the United Kingdom (Clarke Study);
Assessment of the Partnership for Peace Program – January 2001 conducted by NATO.

All those studies confirmed a seriousness of problems that the SR Army faced with. Three of them had a direct impact on intensifying the reform effort. The most significant was the Garrett study. It was the first comprehensive study conducted by the U.S. government. The findings and recommendations represented the official opinion of the U.S. government. The Garrett Study primarily focused on “The Concept of the Ministry of Defence Reform till 2002” (with outlook to 2010) and compared it with a real state of the forces. The main Garrett’s statement about “hollow forces” became a tool used by opposition parties against the government and by some coalition partners against the Minister of Defence. They said that it was the result of a new government, and particularly of a new Minister of Defence. The Garrett Study’s assessment and its recommendations opened up discussion in the broad security and defence society and created the environment necessary for a real reform of the security and defence system. In March 2000, following the Garrett Study, the Slovak Republic Minister of Defence requested assistance from the U.S. DoD to provide services which were necessary to plan and support Slovak defence modernization efforts. The U.S. Department of Defense selected Cubic Applications, Inc. (CAI) to provide this support. This assistance was planned in three phases. The first phase, initiated in September 2000, consisted of a “top-to-bottom” assessment of the current defence posture within the Slovak Republic. Its principal focus was to address the current state, practices, legislation, regulations and policies, and to provide prioritized recommendations. As requested by the Minister of Defence, this Defence Review was “build” on:

- Garrett Study;
- Clarke Study; and
- C4 Study.

The second phase focused on helping Slovak military experts to create a “Long Term Plan” for implementation of approved recommendations of Cubic’s “Defence Review”. The third phase resided in helping with implementation of the “Long Term Plan”. The agreement was signed by the General Director of Defence Policy and Defense Planning for a five-year period. Result of the first phase was Cubic’s Defense Review that confirmed most of the findings mentioned in Garrett Study, and agreed with the majority of its recommendations – the same applies to the Clarke and C4 Studies. The
Cubic’s Defense Review was delivered in January 2001 and the NATO Assessment was delivered in February 2001. Both documents highlighted many areas where reform had to be intensified, as well as those areas where current defence plans were too ambitious. Moreover, these assessments came to the common conclusion: the SR Army failed to move more quickly to the forces based upon the western doctrine and more realistic threat conditions. They were especially critical of inadequate resource levels given the planned size of the force and the large amount of equipment that needed to be modernized. They expressed the need to finalize an overall military strategy.

The combination of this negative report and personal involvement in economic scandal caused that the Minister of Defence (Mr. Kanis) lost support of his own political partners. The new Minister of Defence, Mr. Stank, came with a clear objective to lead the Slovak military towards the NATO membership, which became more real at the Prague Summit where Slovakia was invited to join NATO.

As for Defence department and the AF, representatives of the MoD admitted that realisation of the 1999 – 2000 reform was backed neither by new security documents nor with development of appropriate sources (funds). The lack of strategic documents induced that defence planners were not backed by appropriate legislative documents – laws, notices, etc., which would unambiguously establish responsibilities and relations among the Parliament, Government, MoD, General Staff and rules for civilian and democratic control of the defence area.

Defence planning as a system posed another problem. The process started with some kind of institutionalisation. At the MoD level, the Defence Planning and Resource Management branch was created, under the Defence Policy Division. Later in 2005, it started to work as an independent division, though an attempt to introduce the defence planning started earlier, in 1995, at the MoD level.

In 1997, implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), as a part of it the Defence Resources Management Model (DRMM) for 1998 – 2002, was approved. However, a complete implementation of defence planning required revision of several military doctrines and norms, as well as harmonisation with the NATO defence planning system. Despite some progress, the level of defence planning during the 1999 – 2001 period did not reach expected level. The

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intensification of planning process stared during 2001 – 2002, after approval of three main strategies: security, defence and military one.

Period 2001 – 2005: Launch of the Long-Term Planning Process after the Preparation of Basic Strategic Documents

After NATO experts’ recommendations, particularly after the preparation of so called Garrett Study in 2000, a preparation of new strategic documents started. The Garrett Study concluded that the SR policy and strategy-related documents provided ample details determining what had to be accomplished, but very little guidance on how to achieve those goals. This was a major obstacle to the national defence reform. It emphasized that documents established by the SR had to correct it and recommended the highest priority on their completion, publication, and periodic review.

As regards the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, the MoD representatives admitted that implementation of the 1999 – 2000 reform was backed neither by new security documents nor by development of appropriate resources. Due to the lack of strategic documents, defence planners were not backed by appropriate legislative documents – especially laws, notices, etc. – that would unambiguously determine responsibilities and relations among the Parliament, the Government, the MoD, and the General Staff, as well as rules for civilian and democratic defence area control.

The defence planning as a system posed another problem. The process started with some kind of institutionalisation. At the MoD level, under the Defence Policy Division, the Defence Planning and Resource Management branch was created. Later, in 2005, it started to work as an independent division. However, an attempt to introduce the defence planning started even earlier, in 1995, at the MoD level. In 1997, implementation of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and its part – the Defence Resources Management Model (DRMM) for 1998 – 2002, was approved. Complete implementation of defence planning, however, required revision of several military doctrines and norms, as well as harmony with NATO defence planning system. Despite some progress, the level of defence planning during the period 1999 – 2001 did not reach an expected level. The intensification of planning process stared during 2001 – 2002, after approval of 3 main strategies – security, defence and the military one.

War, Endangerment, and Emergency represented the way out for the next laws preparation. Among laws which secure the defence and which created conditions for our entry into NATO, there were Constitutional Law on Security, Law on the Defence, Armed Forces Law, and Law on Conscription. They are still valid (of course after several amendments). The complexity of these documents is shown in the Table 1. Blue coloured fields represent cancelled documents.

The Defence Strategy was understood as a transition document. It replaced the Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic (from 1994) and the National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic (restricted from 1996). Its main objective was to create a systemic and material basis to secure the defence of the Slovak Republic, while creating conditions of transition, in order to secure the national defence within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through taking into account the security environment and the defence resources of the State. One of the main goals was to create new conceptual documents and legal standards in the area of the National Defence, and thus initiate the State defence system reform and the defence planning process at the national level. According to the DS, in order to achieve compatibility with command and control systems of the NATO member states’ armed forces, it was necessary to reassess AF management and command, and subsequently to ensure management of all components of the AF by the Slovak Republic Ministry of
Defence.\textsuperscript{7} At the same time, it was important to prepare a transition period necessary for transformation of the troops of the SR Ministry of Interior and the railway troops of the SR Ministry of Transport, Postal Services and Telecommunications to non-military components that would not be a part of the AF, but would fulfil the tasks within their respective departments.

**The Slovak Republic Defence Planning According to the Defence Strategy 2001\textsuperscript{8}**

Defence Strategy quoted:

*Defence planning must be a part of the State management and an integral part of the state planning process. It will represent a complex process carried out by the Government and the state administration bodies for ensuring the defence of the State. The Slovak Republic Defence Planning will be aimed at:*

- defining the long-term plans and medium-term programmes for the defence of the State, which will ensure effective utilization of the defence resources of the State according to specified priorities;

- ensuring stability of defence expenditures;

- co-ordination and improving the effectiveness of the work of state administration competent bodies;

- improving the effectiveness of mutual co-operation of the Slovak Republic with the NATO bodies and creating the conditions for smooth interconnecting of the defence planning within the NATO defence planning;

- creating the material conditions for more effective participation of the AF in the planning and implementation of international political-military co-operation, including the participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;

- improving the transparency of expenditures used for the defence.

*To support the defence planning, the SR will introduce a system of defence planning, programming and budgeting which will ensure the defence of the State. Budgetary resources for defence in particular years based on long-term and medium-term priorities and tasks defined in the following*

\textsuperscript{7} Another step was a preparation of a transition period needed for transformation of the Armed Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Railway Troops (armed) of the Ministry of Transport, Postal Services and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic to non-military elements which will not be part of the Armed Forces, but will fulfill the tasks within their respective departments.

\textsuperscript{8} The Slovak Republic Defence Strategy 2001. Articles 67 – 70.

se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=077AAD34-B43E-6551-C03D-619F8996AF63&lng=en.

The Slovak Republic Military Strategy became the principal source of defence reform guidance. As required by the Defence Planning System, the Military Strategy was developed to provide the strategic guidance for the armed forces. It served as a conceptual guidance to the working groups that fleshed out their specific proposals and completed the complementary documents, The Organizational Structure of the Slovak Republic Ministry of Defence, the Programme Force Model 2010 document, and The Long Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces. Ultimately, all of these inputs served as the basis and rationale for the overall plan to reform the Slovak Republic Army (SRA) within the Slovak Republic (SR) Force 2010. The Military Strategy became the most critical document from a force development perspective. It directed a three-tiered force design: High Readiness Force, Forces at Lower Readiness and Long Term Build-Up Forces. Model Force 2010 preparation is shown in the Table 2.

Reform Planning for 2001
SR Force 2010: Process and Products

The Long Term Planning Process represented for the first time that rigorous cost analysis was incorporated into defence planning. The applied cost analysis model was based on the Defence Resource Management Model methodology. The basic steps were: to predict the annual funding level for 2002 – 2010 period, to determine a ratio of operation to modernization costs for every year of the reform, and to develop cost analysis methodology. Previous reform efforts were severely under-funded
and conducted without inputs of a strategic planning process that would effectively and realistically determined the objectives, while taking into consideration economic resources.

This led to inappropriate, incomplete, or stalled implementation. The SR Force 2010 was developed with a reasonable annual funding level in mind. The Governments promised the defence planners that in 2005 they can expect military spending at the level of 1.89 % of GDP. From 2006 onward, there was an expectation that defence spending would increase minimally to 2 % of GDP (The SR Force 2010 document, 2002, p.19).

The threat analysis conducted within the military strategy called for the development of a force structure that would transform the SRA into a smaller, but high quality force, capable to contribute to a wide range of collective security operations across the entire spectrum of war. A major goal of the SR Force 2010 is to reduce the overall manpower levels from the current level of 40,000 (including civilian employees) to approximately 24,000, with a possibility of further reductions, as the final force structure evolves (The SR Force 2010 document, 2002: p. 48). The Force 2010 called for radical change that would reduce a number of senior grade officers and increase the number of junior officers and NCOs. The SRA had simultaneously met the additional challenge – to eliminate conscription and move to all-professional force by 2006.

In 2001 the first steps of building the defence planning system started, along with the Long Term Plan development. In this experimental year, so called “zero year” started for cycle 2002 – 2007, in accordance with NATO 5+1 year cycle. The first year of the defence planning for 2002 – 2008 was a way out for the 2003 national budget preparation. It was launched on the basis of the MoD Defence Planning Guidance and selected ministries prepared the annual budget. The main problem was that this “first year” of defence planning cycle had not been backed by The Long Term Plan. Thus the first cycle which was based on the Long Term Plan was a planning cycle launched in accordance with the Defence Planning Guidance for years 2003 – 2009. In this way, it has created conditions also for programmes and budget planning for years.

It is interesting that the first DP Guidance was restricted, in contrast to the situation in NATO countries. Foreign experts recommended to remove excessive secreting of information within the defence resources area. In June 2002 the government approved an open document The Defence Planning Methodology.

The first phase of the reform (in 2006 horizon) should have put the accent on communication ability, armament modernization, as well as strategic transport provision and sustainability of the High Readiness Force. Material facilities and equipment of other units (so called Forces at Lower

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9 In 2003, it was 32,800 (13,700 professionals; 8,600 conscripts; 10,500 civilians), in 2004 it was 25,400 (21,000 professionals and 4,400 civilians, till March 2005 it was 84 % professionalisation, till the end of 2005 100% were planned).
Readiness) had a secondary priority, thus financial resources intended for their improvement ought to have been provided as late as the second phase. In 2004 Slovakia became a NATO member country.

The membership in the NATO collective defence and security system provided Slovakia with contractual security guarantees which enabled effective defence with maximum use of collective defence advantages. Through the NATO membership, Slovakia fully entered collective force planning. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, a package of the Force Goals 2004 was officially adopted. It has formed a basis for a new structure of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, too. In December 2004, the governmental committee for the NATO membership preparation (PRENAME) terminated its activity. This mechanism, based on the Alliance internal functioning, defined a new, comprehensive and interdepartmental approach to defence planning. So the year 2004 became the last one of fulfilling the National Programme of the SR Preparation for NATO Membership (NP PRENAME). However, at the same time, new programmes began. Those related to full involvement of the Slovak Republic in the Alliance defence planning and package of capabilities, known under the title NATO Force Goals 2004.

Through the Force Goals 2004 adoption, the NATO planners tried to achieve approximately the same level of capabilities as in particular NATO member states. Through adoption of these goals, we were invited to re-evaluate existing strategic plans and documents, since the spectrum of our armed forces action in the Alliance configuration was extending. The Slovak Republic committed itself to prepare mechanized battalion with appropriate combat support and combat service support elements; then radiological, chemical and biological defence battalion; as well as two other smaller units; and all this within 3 years. Till 2010, we undertook to prepare the main contribution in form of mechanized brigade with complete combat support and combat service support elements, as well as other smaller units at the company level. The Force Goals represented qualitatively new requirements for forces detachment and their military capabilities. Through their extent, they markedly exceeded the then commitments, including those that were defined in then existing Long-Term Plan of Armed Forces Development – Model 2010.

Financial demands of the Force Goals required considerable reduction in armed forces target numbers, which led to other significant interferences into the forces structure. In the course of 2004, admission to the NATO defence planning and Force Goals 2004 adoption required updating of the Model 2010 that used to be a corner stone of the defence planning. Long-term planning cycle 2004 had to take into consideration the contributions into the defence dimension of the European Union that we joined in the same year, 2004. Other points that had to be taken into consideration were requirements following from new threats, there were also some imperfections of the Model 2010 and several failures during its implementation caused – inter alia – by actual inaccessibility of financial resources it was based on. The Long-Term Plan till 2010 was based on allocation of 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) for the armed forces reform needs, within the Ministry of Defence budget chapter. We never managed to
reach this level (which stays unrealistic even after 2008). In this way, none of the governments met its obligation that was confirmed in the NATO Headquarters several times, which then (but also now) brought about troubles within performing national missions by the SR armed forces. Even then, it was clear that defence spending – confronted with other social transformation priorities – reached the ceiling, at least in a short-term and medium-term horizon. To reach 2% of GDP for defence remained just a kind of ambition. That is why it was necessary to put greater emphasis on resources spending effectiveness, which in the MoD conditions meant to continue in improving defence planning system.\textsuperscript{10} It was assumed that broader modernization projects would be carried out after the professionalization finished.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, it is possible to assess this delay as something positive, since Slovakia did not buy expensive weapon systems that – in regard to interoperability with NATO – did not have to represent priorities and could reduce financial resources allocated for the reform. On the other hand, there used to be delays in provision of crucial means, particularly in area of information and communication systems. The resources budgeted for the development were “cannibalized” by expenses on maintenance, personnel and unplanned operations abroad. Militarization process, notably its acquisition phase, was becoming a kind of chronic problem causing late introducing of weapon systems and too high prices of commercially available equipment.

Following a need to intensify the armed forces reform, a fully reviewed conceptual document \textit{The Armed Forces Reform – MODEL 2010} entitled \textit{The Long-Term Plan of the Ministry of Defence Development with Outlook to 2015}, that started to be implemented successively, was presented to the government. A summary analysis of the main assessing documents from the beginning of 2004 discovered, inter alia, that national defence planning still was not fully harmonized with allied defence planning procedures. It also proved that politico-strategic and military-operational plans did not have an expected impact on defence system and armed forces development. Within the MoD expenses assessment, a too wide and no-address scale was used. Defence planning did not dispose of effective feedback. Moreover, acquired knowledge and information were predominantly assessed at administrative level and did not reflect in long-term objectives, programme intentions, or economic analyses evaluation.

**Partial Conclusion**

In 2004, following the changes in the Slovak Republic’s security position and environment – related to the SR accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union – as well as new development of the security situation in the world, a process of the SR defence reassessment began.

\textsuperscript{10} Mário Nicolini: Slovenská republika rok po vstupe do NATO, Euroatlantic Centre 10.5. 2005. (Mário Nicolini: The Slovak Republic one Year after its Accession to NATO, Euroatlantic Centre, May 10, 2005.)

\textsuperscript{11} Modernization remains one of the topical problems even after 2008; author’s note.
The preparation of new Slovak Republic Security Strategy and the Slovak Republic Defence Strategy (passed in 2005) launched. At the same time, updating Long-Term Plan of the SR AF Structure Development – Model 2010 initiated, too.\(^\text{12}\)

**Reason for reviewing/updating the SR security documents, in particular Security Strategy:**

- Principal change of the SR position after the accession to NATO and the EU.

**Reason for reviewing/updating the SR Military Strategy and Defence Planning Process 2010:**

- Failure to implement some aspects of the reform and difficulty with receiving expected resources.
- New NATO approach to the Force Goals:
  - F 2010 (oriented to provide combat forces – battalion and brigade task force) primarily for A-5 collective defence operations;
  - NATO review of the Force Proposals has requested corps level Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support Units (CSS) declared to be deployable outside the NATO region (in 2001 we did not anticipate such changes).

**Situation after Accession to NATO and the EU – Influence of New Strategic Documents Approved in 2005**

**Political and Security Situation after Slovak Republic’s Accession to NATO**

After the Slovak Republic joined NATO and the EU in the spring of 2004, a process of security environment assessment was executed. This process became a platform for elaboration of the Slovak Republic’s Defence Policy Directives, following a NATO document Threat Assessment (MC 161/02). The directives were approved by a resolution of the Slovak

\(^{12}\) From the foreword of the *Model 2015*, the SR MoD document.
Republic Government (in 2004) and their conclusions provided basis for political-military and strategic reassessment of the security environment defence aspects.  

The problem was (likewise in 2000 – 2001), that the defence reassessment became without elaboration of new strategic documents. Those were not approved until 2005. Some analysts presume that the department of defence influenced those strategic documents through changes in planning, and not vice versa. Initiative was, once again, rather on the part of the defence department. That was understandable, when taking into consideration that after accession to NATO and EU, both institutions defined requirements for contribution to capabilities more openly. The difficulties were caused by slow reaction of the decision sphere (away from the MoD), but particularly of the parliamentary one. It is possible to say that a preparation of these documents could start immediately after the 2002 elections, considering Slovakia was invited to join NATO and EU. The government’s statement of policy from 2002 emphasized that “current strategic conceptual documents and legal regulations, as well as character and training of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, have to meet collective defence requirements, even in the new security conditions of the present day and the nearest future.” A preparation of the Defence Policy Guidance (2004) represented an attempt to overcome this vacuum existing in the security documents.

The Defence Policy Guidance (2004) assumed a revision of Defence Strategy and Military Strategy, with aim to prepare a new Defence Strategy in connection with a new Security Strategy. The guidance called for defining the SR political-military ambitions, in order to express our tasks in NATO and the EU, and tasks of the Armed Forces. Reading this document, one must allow an idea that DPG surpasses a preparation of new Security Strategy as a consequence of Armed Forces needs (after joining NATO and changes in NATO requirements). The better way would be to prepare the Security Strategy firstly as a kind of an umbrella document. In this document, there are issues and areas that should be solved in the Security Strategy.

In the course of the defence reassessment analysis, it was observed that the Slovak republic’s membership in NATO and the EU had changed internal security environment and represented articulated security guarantees, ensured by NATO. The Slovak Republic accepted commitments resulting from its NATO and EU membership, and thus joined the collective defence system. Conclusions from defence reassessment initiated update of the Slovak Republic Security Strategy and the Slovak Republic Defence Strategy, including the Long-Term Plan of Armed Forces Structure and Development – the Slovak Republic Armed Forces – Model 2010. An actual influence upon the defence reassessment was

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proved by so-called *NATO Force Goals 2004*, passed by a resolution of the Slovak Republic Government. The Ministry of Defence thus launched a process aimed to update the *Slovak Republic Defence Strategy* and the *Long-Term Plan of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces Structure and Development – Model 2010* and to broaden its planning outlook to 2015. These documents comprised collective defence intentions, objectives and tasks that resulted from NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitments (2002), Force Goals 2004, and Istanbul Summit conclusions.

To sketch in the situation, the above-mentioned document stated that a next process of the armed forces reform should accept these facts:\(^{14}\)

a) NATO collective defence is considered to be a crucial method of the SR defence;

b) SR Armed Forces are developed as a part of the NATO Armed Forces structure, with a key mission for Article 5. At the same time, they should be able to contribute into the NATO operations away from Article 5;

c) Meeting commitments of the Slovak Republic towards NATO (Force Goals 2004, PCC) represents a **key priority** within financial provision; at the same time, conclusions resulting from a process of EU military capacities creation are also taken into consideration;

d) Building and sending of combat units as well as building and detachment of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units have to be provided simultaneously;

e) The forces have to be built-up with accent on rules of engagement, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability with the NATO members’ armed forces.

The NATO and EU membership influenced also a preparation of strategic documents in 2005. The Slovak Republic agreed with primary objectives and functions resulting from the Alliance Strategic Concept and the European Security Strategy. This orientation gives rise to two out of four primary objectives of the defence policy:\(^{15}\)

- to fulfil all commitments of a NATO member;
- to fulfil commitments of an EU member within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.

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\(^{14}\) Ibid, part 2.1.3.  
\(^{15}\) The Defence Strategy 2005, Article 18.
In comparison with the *SR Defence Strategy 2001* and the *SR Military Strategy 2001*, the tasks resulting from NATO and EU membership were concretised and better responded to the European Security Strategy and the European Security and Defence Policy. Even in time of the *Defence Strategy 2005* preparation, the Slovak Republic took into account that in December 2003 the EU Security Strategy was adopted and, on the basis of the new ambition defined therein, the Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) was drawn up. During 2004, the SR started to analyse the reassessment of its existing contribution for purpose of the EU military crisis management.

**New Situation Required the Model 2010 Amendment**

Due to the changes of the Slovak Republic’s security position, a process of strategic reassessment of the Slovak Republic defence and top-strategic documents afforded conditions for modification of the long-term defence planning cycle. Regarding new conditions and new NATO Force Goals 2004, it was necessary to amend the *Long-Term Plan of Armed Forces Development – Model 2010*. In December 2005, the government approved the *Long-Term Plan of Ministry of Defence Development with Outlook to 2015*.

**Starting points for the Model 2015 preparation were the following ones:**

*a) New Strategic Documents*

- the SR Security Strategy;
- the SR Defence Strategy;
- the Long-Term Plan of SR MoD Development with Outlook to 2015.

*b) NATO Force Goals*

c) *New Estimate of Resource Assumption for the SR MoD Budget:*

- in period 2006 – 2010 it represents 1.85 % of GDP
- in period 2010 – 2015 it represents 1.86 % of GDP

On October 13, 2004, the Slovak Republic Government approved the *Draft Budget of the Public Administration for years 2005 – 2007*, where a share of defence spending
represented 1.9% of GDP – 1.86% of GDP for the MoD department and 0.04% of GDP for other ministries and central organs of the public administration. Pursuant to an expenses plan, a presumed limit for the MoD department (from 2008 to 2011) represented 1.86% of GDP. Later development showed that even this percentage is hardly realizable. Nevertheless, it is necessary to add that an absolute budget for the defence department represented in Slovak crowns (SKK) was raising up.

A progression of this planning process preparation is demonstrated in the following tables:
Model 2010 review had 2 aspects:

**EXTERNAL ASPECTS**

NATO TRANSFORMATION

- changes in political-military strategy;
- requirements on force structure and capabilities;
- emphasis on deployable units;
- expeditionary force;

EU MILITARY POLICY

- NATO-EU relation;
- EU security/military policy;
- EU vs. NATO requirements;

**INTERNAL ASPECTS**

- Results and experience from the current Long-Term Plan implementation;
- Defence Planning System;
- Resources Availability;
- NATO/EU Accession;

The *Model 2015* is not a new conception, but only an amendment of the *Model 2010*. The *Model 2010* was based on individual defence and at the same time it provided ground for the integration to NATO. At the present day, a membership in joint defence and security system grants us a promissory security guarantee based on a joint principle. These reasons have influenced a progress in the armed forces requirements. There is a shift from the forces for individual defence towards the forces for common defence, from orientation on Article 5 operations towards of wider engagement and better interoperability. Addition of CS/CSS units requirements have represented a significant change. In other words, the philosophy of approach has changed. Comparison of these models is demonstrated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Model 2010</strong></th>
<th><strong>MODEL 2015</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Goal:</strong> to defend national strategic interests independently; to ensure the preparedness for accession to NATO, and to modernize in a long-term framework.</td>
<td><strong>Strategic Goal:</strong> to restructure the armed forces for a full spectrum of Alliance operations (with preservation of ability to defend national strategic interests) in accordance with the NATO and EU requirements and commitments to other international organizations or coalitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balanced Force for Self-Defence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Contributor to Collective Defence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Less Deployable: Focused on Article 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>More Deployable: No Restrictions</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The changes defined in the new long-term plan should guarantee that the armed forces will dispose of ability specified in the Force Goals 2004 in a medium-term outlook to 2010. The next step comprises implementation of the Force Goals 2006, so that the Slovak Republic could adequately carry out obligations arising from the North Atlantic Treaty by 2015.

The starting points for the Model 2015 preparation were the following ones:

a) New Strategic Documents:

- the SR Security Strategy
- the SR Defence Strategy
- the Long-Term Plan of the SR MoD Development with Outlook to 2015

b) NATO Forces Goals

c) New Estimate of Resources Assumption for the SR MoD Budget:
for period 2006 – 2010 it represents 1.85 % of GDP
for period 2010 – 2015 it represents 1.86 % of GDP

From the aspect of planning, the year 2005 thus represented a partial success. In *Comprehensive Assessment of the SR Defence in 2005*, there has been the following statement: The SR Defence Strategy requirements were incorporated into the *Long-Term Plan of the Ministry of Defence Development with Outlook to 2015*. It managed to partially reduce the tension between political-strategic and force-development (defence) planning. Effectiveness of defence planning was unfavourably influenced by inconsistent respect for given priorities of the Ministry of Defence development, complexity of programme structure, large number of subjects entering the programme budgeting processes, excessive number of obligatory indicators, need to ensure budgetary provision of the tasks, that were not passed in budgetary breakdown.\(^{16}\)

The *Long-Term Plan of SR Ministry of Defence with Outlook to 2015*, which is incorporated also in Model 2015, responded to the fact that after the SR admission to NATO and the EU, a great shift has occurred in its security system and the armed forces. That is why it amends a previous medium-term model (2010) and defines particularly the MoD priorities, requirements and tasks of the armed forces in a more realistic spirit, follows a planning limit 1.9 % of GDP for the department. It contains a crucial change, which is a formation of expeditionary forces, a use of collective defence instead of individual one, and including of preventive security activities in accordance with international coalitional treaties.

**Problems that Remain Despite Increase in Defence Planning Quality: Military-Political Ambitions vs. Reality**

According to the Defence Strategy 2005, the political-military ambition of the Slovak Republic is to prepare its Armed Forces for participation in at least two simultaneous operations. The priority shall be to attain readiness, firstly for NATO-led operations, and secondly for peace support operations led by international organizations\(^{17}\).

Military-political ambitions mentioned in the defence strategy were particularised in the *Model 2015*, e.g. ability to keep 8 % of army (ground force) in operations (40 % of force has to meet the requirement of deployment availability\(^{18}\). The rotation of units in operations at level of battalion and


\(^{18}\) Practically, the 40 % of deployable forces represent approximately 4,000 troops ready for engagement, and 8 % of deployable and sustainable forces represent approximately 800 troops.
battalion group or element of expense equality to the battalion is expected. The plan does not expect
the ability for rotation of brigade group provided by itself.

In course of 2005 – 2008, a contradiction between the military-political ambitions and reality emerged. There was also a shift of terms connected with promised readiness of a bigger type of land combat unit for the NRF and a chemical unit; e.g. a term for readiness of a mechanized brigade group shifted by 7 years, which the NATO negotiating team accepted, but after initial surprise and disenchantment.

One of the problems connected with the defence reforms provision and improvement of capabilities was and still is a non-fulfilment of governmental promise of the defence spending in an amount of 2 % of GDP. Recent three years, since 2005, have shown that even an estimate of 1.86 % of GDP was not realistic. In fact, another decrease in percentage has come about, although expenses have not been rising in reality.

- in 2005 it was 1.77% of GDP, which actually represented 25.341 milliard SKK
- in 2006 1.65% of GDP 26.987 milliard SKK
- in 2007 1.51% of GDP 27.987 milliard SKK
- in 200819 1.682% of GDP
- in 2009 1.687 % of GDP
- in 2010 1.685% of GDP

In course of 2006, military planners had to cut almost 1 milliard SKK and in course of 2007 almost 0.5 milliard SKK in comparison with data from the approved national budgets. In the Comprehensive Defence Assessment for 2006, it was stated that neither a purchase of new land technique, nor a modernization of out-dated technique were realized.

A critical attitude was adopted in the Comprehensive Defence Assessment for 2007. Let us quote:

“Contrary to the past, a fundamental change which happened within a defence department planning area is that only those things are planned for which real financial resources are guaranteed.

Planning according to the available economic framework has demonstrated within content, resource, and time interconnection between a process of acceptance of the Force Goals 2004 proposals and a process of the Long-Term Plan 2015 reassessment.

- Analysis of the Long-Term Plan has demonstrated that a possibility to achieve originally planned objectives and priorities in a required quality and within originally determined time horizons is unrealistic and unrealizable.

19 Podľa návrhu, ktorý schválila vláda v roku 2006, s výhľadom do roku 2010. –pozn. autorov
- The basic reasons of this situation were particularly the following ones: *internal deficits from the previous period, macro-economic planning starting points and reserves in the provision process without sufficient resources*. *This results in a necessity to reassess it fundamentally with a view to harmonize political-military ambition of the SR with real financial possibilities of the State.*

In 2007, the Long-Term Plan was reassessed, or better say updated, once again. The process started on the bases of the government’s statement of policy from 2006, which observed: “... the SR Government will intensify its efforts in promotion of comprehensiveness and efficiency of the defence and create preconditions for improvement of the defence control system, inter alia through an up-date of the Long-Term Plan of the SR MoD Development 2015.” This was followed by the government’s statement of policy from February 2007, which assigned the Ministry of Defence to reassess the SR AF Model 2015 and suggest a way of the Long-Term Plan adjustment.

**Reasons for the Long-Term Plan 2015 Reassessment**

- Imbalance between tasks and resources
  - increase in tasks without additional financial backing
    - more demanding Force Goals (2004, 2006, 2008);
    - new missions throughout the year;
    - unplanned assistance tasks for state administration authorities;
  - constant budgetary previsions for various reasons, shift of financial resources from priority projects to “new” and substitutive ones;
  - failure to comply promised budget for defence
- Experience gained in DP 2015 carrying out
  - differences between DP and reality;
  - command and control;
  - increase in numbers of NATO and EU representations.

Therefore, defence planners for defence tasks performance modified an amount of assumed allocation of financial resources in the SR MoD budget category on defence tasks performance (it means on the behalf of Force Goals 2006, too):

- from 2 % to 1.85 % of GDP in 2006 – 2010
- in an amount of 1.86% of GDP from 2011.
As it has been already demonstrated, neither this reduction corresponds to reality. According to the available analyses, a deficit of available resources could reach 23.6 milliard SKK – what represents about 2.9 milliard SKK per year – in contrary to the resources intended in the Model 2010.

To better understand the complexity of this process, we will try to analyse the reasons, or better say “starting points” of this update:

1. MC 400 – Security Environment Assessment (NATO document)
2. The Slovak Republic Defence Strategy (2005);
3. Defence Policy Directive for 2008-2013 (developed on the basis of a NATO directive);
4. The Catalogue of the SR AF tasks resulting from laws, strategic documents and international commitments (developed at the SR MOD);
5. The Long-Term Plan of the SR AF Development and Structure – Model 2010;
6. The Long-Term Plan of the SR MOD Development – Model 2015;
7. The SR Force Goals 2004 (NATO requirements updated in 2-year cycles);
8. The SR Force Goals 2006\(^{20}\) (NATO requirements updated in 2-year cycles);
9. The SR National Attitudes to Force Goals Proposals 2008 (a proposal was known in 2007; it is approved in 2008);
10. The SR Defence Assessment (elaborated in 2-year intervals; a proposal is for 4-year intervals);
11. Defence Requirement Review 2007 (NATO document);

A simplified outline depicting the impact of NATO and the SR documents is demonstrated in the following scheme:

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\(^{20}\) Force Goals 2006, in comparison with 2004, require from the SR less land combat units and – on the contrary – more units of combat service support. The aim is to build, within the SR AF, deployable capabilities of more comprehensive character – author’s comment.
Another factor, with which military planners could not count, is an influence of the worldwide financial crisis. According to the budget approved by the SR government for 2009, the defence spending will reach only 1.4 % of GDP, which represents 32 milliards SKK – 1.06 milliards of euros (an increase by 0.7 % in comparison with year 2008). The defence department is thus forced to dismiss altogether 1,440 civilian employees, which represents 25 % of their overall number, till February 2009. Likewise, in time of writing this paper, dissolution of two commands subordinated to the command of training and support forces was planned. A supposed decrease in number of soldiers – professionals has not been known.

**Conclusion**

Experience of defence planning development at departmental and national level have confirmed a need for permanent analysis of the security environment and preparation of political-strategic decisions as a starting point for defence planning preparation. On the other hand, this process requires a consistent feedback to make military-political ambitions not only a pure unrealistic idea, but to provide them with adequate capabilities of the armed forces and creation of sufficient resources for their formation.
Within a preparation of the whole defence planning system, a positive influence of a pre-accession process to NATO has proved. During this process, the defence department, as well as governmental structures, prepared for interconnection with the NATO planning system – the system of defence control and planning was harmonized with the NATO procedures. On the other hand, NATO requirements “forced” to improve the planning system. Despite this, other analyses identically warn that national defence planning is still not fully harmonized with procedures of the allied defence planning.21

Accession to NATO and the EU pointed out a need of more consistent anticipation of development in the security realm, and the possibilities to change their requirements on member states – including the Slovak Republic. The planning documents were “under the pressure” of both institutions and prepared either without covering by umbrella strategic documents or at best simultaneously with them. This has negatively reflected in a need for “reassessment” of the long-term plans and subsequently in changes within programmes, programme structure, or in non-implementation of the programmes.

In terms of internal problems within defence planning, it is necessary to call attention to problems within cohesion of long-term plans with medium-term programme planning and budgeting. What is positive is a division of responsibility for long-term, medium-term, and short-term planning. On the other hand, a negative is represented by interventions exceeding the tasks determined in the long-term plans. This manifests either in integration of programmes, with which the long-term planning does not count, or in non-implementation of approved programmes. Interventions into annual budgets and low discipline in observance of budgets have a negative effect, too.

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