

Chapter 6: POLAND

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Threat perception and its implications for security sector

As is believed by Polish expert community and expressed in the most important documents including security threat assessments, in a short-term perspective Poland will not face any major or dramatic shift in its security environment, both in a regional as well as global dimension (see National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2007 and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2009).¹ Rather, it is assumed that the consequences of pending phenomena, as listed below, will influence more or less substantially the security situation around Poland in the near future. Among the most important external factors there are such developments as:

- Globalization, IT revolution;
- Growing competition for natural resources (especially in energy sector, but also food and water shortages);
- Negative impact of economic crisis in the US and the EU, which will influence political unity of the EU and NATO and their capabilities to meet the security challenges;
- Growing loss of political and military interest and commitment to European security by the United States, with its strong reorientation towards the Pacific; loosening ties of the U.S. with Europe and transatlantic community due to ongoing demographic changes in the U.S.;
- Possible negative consequences of transformation of international order from the uni-polar to multi-polar world, in which several “centers of gravity” would arise and reshape the architecture of alliances;
- Increasing influence and political and military assertiveness of “new powers” (Russia, China, India) and their impact on the regional and global stability;

¹ In addition to NSS and DS, most up-to-date and complex assessment of the threats and challenges for the state security is presented in the outcome of the National Security Strategic Review which was held between 2010-2012 by the presidential National Security Bureau. Based on this review, the first White Book on Defence in Polish history was published in June 2013.

- Relative weakening of the institutions which were supposed to guard the international peace and order as the United Nations, the OSCE etc.;
- Erosion of arms control regimes;
- Uncertainty stemming from dramatic political changes in the Middle East that may generate future regional and global conflicts;
- Worrying demographic trends in Western countries;
- Growing influence of non-state actors of different characteristics in shaping international order;
- Climate change;
- New threats and challenges as: cyber-terrorism, proliferation of WMD etc.

This complex and multidimensional landscape is determining Polish assessments and thinking about the future security of the country. Over the last few years there has been a substantial change in Polish approach to selecting methods, which should be used in achieving declared goals in foreign and security policy. Most importantly, there is a growing consciousness in the security community that Poland cannot rely on one “instrument” alone. There is a solid consensus among all major political parties that NATO and the strategic alliance with the United States as an ally with the greatest power projection capability within the North Atlantic Alliance is and will remain a cornerstone of Polish security policy. Nonetheless, the growing awareness that such a multidimensional and complex security landscape forces the government to implement a broader range of instruments to achieve security policy goals. The most important change is the increasing determination of political elites to strengthen the political position of Poland within the European Union (including CSDP) and enhancing regional cooperation (by adding more substance to the initiatives such as V4, the Weimar Triangle etc.). Over the last couple of years “the European focus” is presented by political elites as of paramount importance for realization of Polish security interests.

Perhaps of greatest importance, since Poland joined NATO in 1999, there was also a specific logic presented by subsequent governments while they were formulating tasks and missions for the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). There was a simple assumption that if Poland would engage substantially in out-of-area operations run by the North Atlantic Alliance (which resulted in putting emphasis more on the development of expeditionary forces than on territorial defence) it may count on some kind of “reciprocity” when Polish territory is to be

threatened in a conventional manner (automatism of article 5).² As many developments over the last few years revealed, these assumptions were not entirely correct. Poland and other countries from the CEE region faced many difficulties convincing other Allies about the need to invest in the development of substantial NATO infrastructure in the region. Ultimately, the so-called contingency plans for Poland and Baltic states were finally adopted by NATO and the new Lisbon strategy brought an extremely important “reassurance package,” but the belief that Poland needs more careful and meticulous approach to national defense planning has been already conceived in Polish decision-making circles (Górka-Winter, 2011). As it is stated in the White Book on National Security a model of national autarky in the sphere of defence as well as total reliance on international organizations as NATO should be avoided. Poland should develop both: national capabilities and interoperability with the North Atlantic Alliance and other security organizations which we consider as security providers.

Institutions and coordination

As in other democratic states, the role and tasks of core and non-core security institutions are regulated by law. As it is stated in Polish Constitution - the president of Poland is the head of the armed forces. As Article 126, section 2 of the Constitution states: “The President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory.” Additionally, the President is also representing the State in “foreign affairs.” As provided by other regulations in the Constitution, the President:

1. On request of the Minister of National Defence, shall confer military ranks as specified by statute (art. 134, section 5);
2. In the case of external threats to the State, act of armed aggression against the territory of the Republic of Poland or when an obligation of common defence against aggression arises by virtue of international agreement, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, declare a state of martial law in a part or upon the whole territory of the State (art. 229);
3. In the case of threats to the constitutional order of the State, to security of the citizenry or public order, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of

² As revealed by Wikileaks, these assumptionss were well-known in the U.S. administration as reported by the then U.S. Ambassador to Poland Victor Ashe.

Ministers, introduce for a definite period no longer than 90 days, a state of emergency in a part of or upon the whole territory of the State (art. 230, section 1).

The presidential competences in relation to the defense sector were already provided in the act of 21st November 1967 on the universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland (Law Journal Laws, 2004). As the article 4a, section 1 of the act provides, the President shall:

1. Approve, on request of the Prime Minister, the national security strategy;
2. Issue, on request of the Prime Minister, the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland as well as other documents needed to carry out the national security strategy;
3. Approve, on the request of the Council of Ministers, plans for the national trainings related to defence system and be in charge of their implementation;
4. Make the decision, on the request of the Prime Minister, concerning the introduction or change of particular defence readiness of the state;
5. May address all public, governmental and self-governmental administration entities, heads of other organisational units and social organisations to obtain information important to state's security and defence;
6. Initiate and provide patronage for ventures directed at developing patriotic and defence-related attitudes in the society.

The President may also order, on request of the Prime Minister, general or partial mobilisation and use of Armed Forces for the purpose of defending the country (article 136). The President also acts as a supreme commander of the Armed Forces. He outlines, on request of the Minister of National Defence, the main directions of Armed Forces' development and their readiness to defend the state (article 5, item 1) and may also take part in the briefings of Ministry of National Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland briefings (article 5, item 2).

Moreover, "Whenever, during a period of martial law, the Sejm is unable to assemble for a sitting, the President of the Republic shall, on application of the Council of Ministers, and within the scope and limits specified in Article 228, par. 3-5, issue regulations having the force of statute. Such regulations must be approved by the Sejm at its next sitting" (article 234). The President may also, requested by the Prime Minister, decide about using units and sub-units of the Polish Armed Forces in order to restore normal functioning of the state, if the forces and resources applied so far have been exhausted (article 11 of the act on the state of emergency, 2002).

The president also plays a specific role as far as the use of Polish Armed Forces abroad is concerned. Apart from the Constitution, which sets the general framework for the use of Polish armed forces, basic rules and procedures concerning involvement of Polish military in international operations are provided by “Law on the principles of use or temporary stay of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland outside country’s borders” (Official Journal, 1998). A distinction between the use and temporary stay of the units of the armed forces outside Polish territory is made in this document. The first type of involvement includes several forms of engagement: participation in armed conflict or reinforcement of allies; peacekeeping operation (stabilization and peace support missions); actions concerning prevention of terrorism or mitigation of consequences of terrorist acts. Temporary stays involve non-combat actions such as participation in training and exercises, S&R and humanitarian missions etc. As the temporary stay is concerned, the decision about sending troops is made by Council of Ministries or the minister responsible for particular forces (usually the minister of national defense). For external use of Polish army (collective defense, peacekeeping etc.) the final decision is made by the President on the request of the Council of Ministers.

As provided by these regulations, president of Poland has broad competences and prerogatives at his/her disposal as well as obligations to monitor the threats and challenges to the security of the state. He may issue proposals for the documents and specific actions concerning the defence sector and monitor their implementation. To make these possible, the Constitution also appoints the National Security Council (composed of key state officials) as an advisory body to the President within the scope of matters relating to internal and external security of the state. Moreover, also the National Security Bureau is supporting the President in performing the above-mentioned tasks.

As far as the Minister of National Defence is concerned, the Constitution equips him with the right to realize the supremacy over the Polish Armed Forces during peacetime. The Chief of the Staff and the commanders of the armed forces are subordinated directly to the Minister of the National Defence. Among the most important tasks and responsibilities of the Minister are:

- Management of the Armed Forces during the peacetime;
- Preparation of the assumptions of national defence;
- Realization of the general assumptions, decisions and directives of the Council of Ministers in the area of national defence;

- Execution within the scope of powers given by the Council of Ministers, general supervision over the realization of defence-related tasks by the agencies and bodies of the State Administration, State institutions, local authorities, economic entities etc.;
- Overall leadership in matters connected with the execution of the common national defence duties;
- Fulfillment of international agreements, stemming from the decisions of the Council of Ministers, pertaining to the participation of Polish military contingents in international peacekeeping missions and humanitarian actions and military exercises conducted jointly with other countries or international organizations.

The Minister also supervises, manages and controls the MOD budget, he/she is responsible for human resources and personnel policy, maintaining the armed forces in combat readiness by proper training, maintaining defence cooperation with different international partners etc. In executing all these tasks and duties the Minister is supported by the Chief of the General Staff, the Secretary or Secretaries of State, and the Undersecretaries of State.

The “division of labour” between the President, who is a crucial figure in the Polish constitutional system and the government (especially Minister of Defence) stipulated by the Polish law seems to be quite clear. Nonetheless, many problems may arise when the President and the government represent different political views and this “cohabitation” is not running smoothly due to some fundamental differences in their political perceptions. Such a discord took place at the time when president Lech Kaczyński backed by Law and Justice party and the government formed by the Civic Platform were trying to cooperate on foreign and security policy issues. A deep distrust between these two institutions had severe consequences as these two centers presented completely different visions on crucial issues concerning security and defence issues (with the more pro-Atlantic stance presented by the President who was also advocating an ambitious political agenda towards the Eastern Neighborhood and a “European focus” of the government). Infinite disputes concerning the competences of the president and the government in the security and defence sector have been waged frequently at that time. Such a situation shows that apart from the clear solutions provided by law, if the defence sector is to be run smoothly, the high level of political maturity of all stakeholders is of paramount importance.

Key drivers of security sector reform – external and internal

Before 1999, when Poland finally joined NATO, the aspiration to join the North Atlantic Alliance was the main driver behind the security sector reform in Poland and it showed all characteristics of SSR in the transformational context. After the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact the countries from CEE region regained sovereignty and were free to formulate their foreign and security policies. In Poland, as in other countries in the region, the security sector reform was implemented in the broader context of transformational social and economic agenda which was handled in an entirely peaceful manner, though not without serious and vigorous debate about the shape and tasks of different security sector institutions. The main challenge for the security sector was the elimination of all negative phenomena inherited from the previous system designed to wage a large-scale military confrontation with the use of conventional forces and capabilities. Cutting the number of troops, limiting the extensive procurement programs, dismissing huge bureaucracies, dissolving internal security services used as a tool for political oppression and implementation of “good governance” rules to eliminate corruption, lack of professionalism, and extensive waste of resources were of paramount importance. In this context, the main focus of the reform was around reforming institutions of the state, but over the years there was also a growing role of non-state actors like media, NGOs, think-tanks etc., which became more and more active in generating debate in this domain. It is also due to their active engagement that Poland finally declared membership in NATO as the main goal of its security policy. NATO became a major driving force behind the SSR in Poland as it formulated concrete standards to comply with.³ In September 1995 it adopted a document, which set the most important criteria for candidate countries to meet. These are still valid and a positive evaluation of the progress within SSR remains a condition sine qua non for all prospective candidates for NATO membership.

After Poland joined the North Atlantic Alliance in 1999 NATO has remained the main driving force for SSR. As some experts claimed, acceptance of some countries as NATO members at that time was politically driven, taking into consideration limited military capabilities they were equipped with (security providers *versus* security consumers). As a result, the main political focus for subsequent Polish governments was to present Poland as a reliable ally, willing and able to participate in NATO missions. It meant putting emphasis on professionalization of armed forces (Poland finally abandoned conscription in 2008 and initiated a startup of building a fully-professional army of 100,000 soldiers with National Reserve Force of additional 20,000 troops) and training them mostly for expeditionary

³ On much smaller scale the driving force for the transformation in military domain were such organizations as: the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

operations (with special emphasis on Special Forces). Such an orientation generated also serious consequences for acquisition programs and raised questions about the rationale of investing mainly in expeditionary capabilities while at the same time the program of modernization of Polish Armed Forces was slowed down mainly due to budgetary constraints. Many experts pointed out the inherent dilemma (out-of-area engagement *versus* modernization) since not all expeditionary capabilities may be used for territorial defence. At the same time some doubts arose over the validity of security guarantees provided by NATO as political cohesiveness in the Alliance was weakening especially during the times of the G.W. Bush administration when it started the controversial military intervention in Iraq. Sharp divisions in threat perceptions were revealed among allies and some countries, Poland among them, were criticized for over-engagement with the United States in Iraq, while neglecting the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (which finally resulted in boosting the Polish contingent in this country up to 2,500 soldiers and withdrawal from Iraq).

After more than a decade of permanent expeditionary engagement, there was a growing conviction in the Polish security community that Poland should start to focus more on modernization of its armed forces and initiate an ambitious program, which would boost the lacking or vanishing capabilities (like A&M defence). The main drivers behind this decision were manifold. As it was already mentioned, new threats emerged in the meantime, like growing assertiveness of Russia toward its neighborhood in conjunction with some negative trends within NATO and the EU. There was also a conviction that too much of the Alliance's attention goes to the spots with an indirect impact on the security of the whole NATO. It was believed that it creates a potentially dangerous situation since it limits the possibilities of quick and adequate Alliance reaction within the allied territory when such a need arises. As the most evident example of NATO's "overfocus" on South-Eastern Asia and broader Middle East some experts pointed at complete confusion most allies felt when Russia decided to intervene in Georgia in August 2008. This dramatic event showed two things: firstly, the scenario of a conventional war, which was almost completely ruled out from the national security strategies of NATO countries proved to be not so unlikely as it was assumed in Europe over the last decade; and secondly that the NATO intelligence community neglected monitoring of risks coming from the regions in the closer vicinity to NATO borders.

As an important factor affecting many important decisions concerning the security sector reform in Poland one should also consider a need to sustain the country's economic growth, partly by streamlining the quite substantial financial resources for the development of Polish military industry. As one of the few countries in Europe, Poland is not facing such a dramatic

need to cut its military budget. Quite the contrary, in 2012 the government decided to initiate the biggest and most ambitious program of modernization of Polish Armed Forces after the end of the Cold War by allocating around \$40 billion in military procurement programs (see below). This is not only an effect of reflection of the current threat assessment but these plans are also aimed at giving a boost to Polish economy since many of these contracts are to be realized by national defence industry in cooperation with scientific institutes, foreign partners etc. Innovations and new technologies are expected to be invented and implemented in the process, allowing Polish business to be more innovative and competitive.

As all these developments have proven over the last two decades, the key drivers for the security sector reform in Poland were of external rather than internal nature, reflecting the evaluation of threats and challenges for Polish security, as well as the perception of the effectiveness of the alliances Poland belongs to. Only in recent years an important internal premise (a need to stimulate economic growth by rising military spending) was of a paramount importance for SSR and triggered some changes in the approach to military procurement.

Place of Armed Forces within security sector – mission and raison d'être

The Polish Armed Forces have always been perceived as a key element of Polish national identity and played a crucial role in preserving the national tradition, and the continuity of the Polish state. They were treated by the society as a symbol of national virtues and a major force which allowed Poland to regain independence after 1918, and finally decided about the shape of Polish borders and assured their stability until WWII. The symbolism attached to military victories (but also defeats) of Polish army has always constituted an essence of Polish national identity and was widely popularized in the society (more on this see Terlikowski, M., Madej, M., Górka-Winter, B., 2013). As it is believed, the armed forces have always been a great defender of the society and its national values against foreign aggressions and occupation, excluding the episodes, when, during the communist times, they were used by the communist regime against the rioting workers. In the public discourse, serving in the military was perceived as a honorable duty, though, during the communist regime, when compulsory service encompassed a period of up to two years, many young conscripts refused to join the army ranks either for ideological reasons, or because it was believed as a waste of time in face of other interesting career alternatives. Abandoning conscription in 2008 finally ended this dilemma as Polish army became fully professional. Nonetheless, serving in the military is

now perceived by young people rather as a career choice offering long-term stability and social benefits in an uncertain situation of pending financial crises rather than a show off of patriotic attitude. Noteworthy, the armed forces have always been perceived by the society as a profession held in high esteem. In 2011 the opinion polls showed that almost 80 % of the society has confidence in the military and the armed forces ranked second in reliability among the state services (the first ranked the fire brigades with 89% of support) (Zaufanie do wojska na wysokim poziomie, 2011).

From an official point of view the mere existence of the armed forces has never been questioned after the end of the Cold War. While in many Western countries there was a strong tendency to benefit from the so-called “peace-dividend” resulting in huge limitations of the armies’ size and capabilities, it has never been the case in Poland. As mentioned above, Polish society is strongly attached to the army not only as a symbol of national identity but also as a major force to defend the country in the face of aggression, preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As stated in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, “the size, organization and assets of the armed forces will be continually adapted to defense requirements, allied and international commitments and the social economic potential of the State. As the nature of security threats evolves, static armed forces designed for territorial defense will be gradually phased out in favor of advanced, mobile, highly specialized units. The nature of new risks necessitates cooperation between the armed forces and civilian structures within the scope of response to non-military threats, as well as in rescue and antiterrorist operations in the homeland and outside its borders.” As reflected in the above-mentioned documents there are several core tasks for the PAF today:

- Providing the defense of the state and facing aggression in the framework of commitments stemming from Poland’s membership in NATO;
- Participation in the stabilization operations as well as crisis management and humanitarian missions;
- Supporting internal security of the state and assisting the population if the need arises.

As such, the *raison d’être* of Polish Army has never been questioned by any serious political force (excluding some marginal anarchists associations). Nonetheless, the continuing debate around the current mission of armed forces is taking place, as some of the tasks performed by Polish soldiers are being questioned especially when confronted with diverging interpretation of Polish security interest. Contrary to positive opinions coming from different NATO governments, the engagement of Polish soldiers in Iraq, and in Afghanistan was seriously

contested by some political parties and the Polish society. About 75% of respondents held a negative attitude towards Polish engagement in Afghanistan (Communique BS/127/2009, 2009). It is widely believed that this engagement of PAF is politically motivated (by the willingness to strengthen the ties with the major Polish ally – United States) and has very little to do with the real Polish interests in the area of security. Also, many experts point to the substantial financial costs of this operation which is seen as a factor hampering the process of modernizing PAF and introduce ambitious procurement plans (see for example Bilski, 2009). Especially the Alliance of Democratic Left questioned the rationale for this engagement and pressed for ending the mission already in 2009 (see Uchwała Rady Krajowej SLD nr 23 w sprawie wycofania polskich wojsk z Afganistanu, 2009). Some experts also underline that the experience gained by Polish soldiers in the Afghan military theatre is of no use in a situation if Polish territory is somehow threatened.

As a result of these reflections, in recent years the evaluation of tasks for the PAF has changed substantially. It was openly expressed in many official documents as well as underlined by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, who announced quite recently the buildup of Polish Deterrence Forces, which are to be equipped with modern weaponry enhancing their deterrent potential (Speech of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament, 2013).

Armed Forces restructuring – main trends and challenges

Over the last two years Polish government boosted its efforts to modernize and professionalize the armed forces to meet the requirements of the modern battlefield. In spite of the general decrease of the size of PAF to just 100,000 soldiers (with additional 20,000 soldiers in National Reserve Forces), the level of their combat capabilities is increasing mostly due to the participation of the substantial military contingents in the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and to some extent also, in the Balkans where they were tasked with many different duties including direct combat missions. As one of the few NATO members, Poland also maintains the level of defense spending of around 1.95% suggested by the Alliance (Doran, 2013 or Szatkowski, 2013). In recent years, the armed forces were equipped with quite a substantial set of modern weapons: F-16 fighter jets, CASA transport aircrafts, Rosomak armored personnel carriers, etc., which allows Poland to actively participate in NATO operations and serves to gradually reduce their reliance in this respect on other allies (mainly the U.S.). Unfortunately, the need of equipping military contingents taking part in

foreign operations led to a situation in which some other crucial capabilities were neglected (like A&M Defence, completely obsolete in a couple of years, leaving Polish territory prone to attack from the air and from ballistic missiles). There is, however, a rising awareness among the decision-makers that restructuring of PAF requires long-term planning for defence procurement, which will encompass not only equipment for out-of-area operations but also reflect the needs stemming from the protection of Polish territory. Also, as was stressed by Polish Ministry of Defence for some time already, every NATO ally should not rely on article 5 of the Washington Treaty alone (meaning hoping for allied support in case of being attacked) but focus on implementing article 3 which stresses that “in order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (Kupiecki, Przeciwrakietowa układanka, 2012). This focus on the need to develop national capabilities to defend Polish territory as a major priority for the PAF and building expeditionary capabilities as an additional task for the PAF is often referred as “Komorowski doctrine” as it was first revealed by the presidential National Security Bureau.

In this spirit, in 2012 two crucial documents in this sphere were approved to support this line of thinking: "Program of Development of Polish Armed Forces for years 2013-2022" and the "Technical Modernisation Plan" (signed on December 11). As it was stressed by Minister of National Defence Tomasz Siemoniak "What we want is modern and efficient armed forces which will always be able to defend the sovereignty of our country, support the Allies and help in crisis. The percentage of resources allocated for the most modern armament and the most important operational capabilities is rising" (Przeciwrakietowa układanka , 2012).

According to these plans in the period 2013-2016 Poland is going to spend about 135.5 billion PLN (approximately \$40 billion) on defence procurement and technical modernization. In addition, from 2017 until 2022 the military spending will amount to about 273.2 billion PLN (102.1 billion for technical modernization). In these assumptions several critical capabilities are given a paramount importance:

- Command and control;
- Reconnaissance;
- Destruction and action support capabilities;
- Mobility, survivability and protection of forces;

- Capability to support non-military system in crisis situation including natural and humanitarian disasters;
- Air defence;
- Maintaining combat capabilities of the Navy;
- Effective logistics;
- Developing IT infrastructure and robotization.

On the planned purchase list there are, among other things: complex upgrade of Poland's air and missile defense capabilities (treated as a priority, with the appropriation of 20 percent of planned expenditures), UAVs, helicopters, command-and-control capabilities, tanks, anti-ship missiles etc.

Defence planning and resource management

One of the most important changes in defence planning is currently being implemented. As argued by the main architects of these reforms – the government and the National Security Bureau, it is aimed, apart from the rationalization, at enhancing the effectiveness and adjusting the defence planning and management to Western trends and standards, and strengthening the civilian control over the armed forces. Last but not least, economic calculations are also of paramount importance in these reforms. Starting from 2014 the reform foresees instead of 4 separate commands of the Army, the Navy, the Air Forces and Special Forces only 2 Joint Commands: the General Command responsible for commanding the military during peace-time and the Operational Command, responsible for commanding the military during the war-time and time of crisis. In addition, it is envisioned to command the contingents engaged in foreign deployments. In the current situation it is the Minister of Defence who is commanding the armed forces via the Chief of General Staff. As a result of the reform, the General Staff will concentrate on strategic defence planning and preparation of long-term plans of development of the PAF, instead of current command duties, and will also act as an advisor the President and Minister of Defence. In peace-time, the Minister of Defence will command the armed forces with the assistance of the General Commander, the Operational Commander and the Chief of General Staff, who are answerable to the Ministry of Defence (see National Security Bureau, 2013).

Civil-military relations, parliamentary control over AF

Civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces means the AF are subordinated to democratically elected civilian authorities. Therefore, the quality of this control is determined by the functioning of these authorities, their subordination to the law and the principles of “good governance.” As such, the level and quality of civilian control over the AF in western societies is treated as an important measure of the democratization of the state. In principle, the military should be treated as an important instrument of foreign and security policy but it should act as an individual, political actor in the state (Puchała F., 2012).

Poland has undergone a remarkable evolution towards the western model of civilian control over the Armed Forces as in principle, historically the military has always been an important player on the Polish political scene. It was connected with the role the military played in the process of regaining independence after so many years of partitions and later on, in the aftermath of WWII, with its position in the very specific political environment set by the Cold War. As mentioned above, the level of trust towards the military has always been substantial in the society - even after the tragic events during the communist times when the armed forces were used to suppress the riots in 1950 and 1976 (Madej M., Terlikowski M., Górka-Winter B. 2013). Since that time, much has changed towards the so-called western model. Shortly after the collapse of the communist system, the long and rather painful process of transformation to the civilian control over the PAF has started. An important incentive came from the Alliance and Polish aspirations to become a member. Nevertheless, the discussions about the competences of the civilian and military components, their roles and tasks were very vigorous over the years, and, to some extent still exist. In general, however, the core principles as political neutrality of the Armed Forces and their subordination to the civilian authorities are assured (Trejnis Z., 1997; Wągrowaska 2007). Any single state institution does not possess an exclusive control over the Armed Forces to prevent using them for political purposes. The Parliament, in addition to setting the laws, exercises control over the financing of the military and has the right of inquiry concerning all issues important to the functioning the Armed Forces (their mission, out-of-area deployments, procurement policy etc.). Also, the transparency of the military budget is assured by presenting it to the public. By expert opinions, the civil-military relations and democratic control over the PAF are in solid shape and are not endangered by isolated incidents of insubordination or exceeding the competences.

Human resources, expert potential, military education

The problem of human resources in the Polish defence sector is a very complex one. As far as the Polish Armed Forces are concerned several factors will influence their future capabilities. As it was already mentioned, the new generation of young people which has no duty to serve in the armed forces perceives the military as a professional option rather than a service. Many capabilities within the armed forces are already privatized. Suspending conscription had the same effect as in other countries which had already undergone this process – the feeling of “community” and the obligation to defend the country is slightly weakened, so is the mobilization potential within the nation. At the same time, paramilitary associations are still very active and numerous, sustaining the national military tradition which is exemplified for example in the tradition of reconstruction the historical battles etc.

Additionally, structural changes in the army (including a change in the pension system advertised lately by the government) are having the effect of many soldiers, also those well-trained, highly qualified and experienced in foreign deployments, leaving the military. It cannot be excluded that their skills will be finally capitalized on by some newly established paramilitary organization, which may emerge as a response to such an inflow of specialists on the market. As in many other European states, the negative demographic trends are also underlined. The Polish society is ageing; many young people are also leaving the country seeking more beneficial economic and social conditions, which will seriously influence the mobilization potential of the future armed forces.

The new model of the army is also bringing about changes in the military education. The need for consolidation and centralization of numerous military schools and liquidation of some of them is underlined by many experts. Sustaining too many schools is contradicting the demography trends, limiting the number of forces and goes against the economic calculations. Lately, these proposals were laid out by the National Security Bureau and Academy of National Defence. As many experts underline, the military education is quite backwards compared to other branches of the defence sector. These delays in reforming the military education system are attributed mostly to the independence of many schools, which are defending their particular interests. As general Pacek, the rector of National Defence Academy argues, military universities must confine themselves to military education of the cadres and limit their civilian tasks (Dyskurs nad szkolnictwem, 2012).

It should be also noted that over the past two decades, a substantial pool of experts commenting the military affairs in Poland has emerged. They are active in specialized media devoted to observing Polish security and defence policy and represent numerous think-tanks, NGOs etc. This “security community” is quite large and plays an important role in framing

the issues and proposing recommendations. They are consulted by the government and other state institutions in the process of developing policies (however, still the influence of non-government experts remains limited compared to other Western states which rely on external expertise in a much substantial way.

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